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It is enough/or us to stop our ears to the sound of music in a room where 
dancing is going on, for the dancers at once to appear ridiculous. How many 
human actions would stand a similar test? Should we not see many of them 
suddenly pass from grave to gay on isolating them from the accompanying 
music of sentiment? To produce the whole of its effect, then, the comic 
demands something like a momentary anesthesia of the heart. 
-Henri Bergson 
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Introduction 
 
One of the ways that art contributes to society is by preventing anesthesia of the heart. 
The aesthetic experience characteristically makes us more alive, vibrant, and open to 
possibilities. Aesthetic experience need not be limited to the "fine arts," of course. In this 
project, I consider a broad variety of media, including jokes, modernist poetry, Greek 
tragedy, literature, film, and conversation. What these forms of aesthetic communication 
have in common is their ability to tell stories. I will argue certain features of narrative  
that (typically set aside as ethical considerations) have aesthetic relevance insofar as they 
affect our engagement with the story. I do not intend to minimize the differences between 
racist jokes and Anna Karenina nor blur the distinction mundane conversation and the 
poetry of Robert Frost. I invite the reader to indulge my choice of examples, as I am 
mainly interested in a particular aspect these art forms share-narrative structure and 
aesthetic affect. My terminology (empathy/sympathy/etc) is not constructed as an end, 
but only as a means; insofar as they clarify these shared aspects for my defense of 
ethicism. 
There are three ways one might understand ethicism with respect to jokes: 
 
1. Moral defects detract from aesthetic value (humor). 
 
2. Aesthetic defects have moral impact. 
 
3. Certain moral defects have a structure that is aesthetically flawed. 
 
Although, I do not disagree with the first two claims, it is my intent to argue for the third 
claim. 
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I 
Nu mbing the Heart 
Racist Jokes and Aesthetic Affect 
 
 
When we empathize with a character, we take on that character's feelings: we 
are shocked with her and we hurt when she hurts. This often occurs when reading, 
watching a film, or with any fiction. Usually we do this because we identify with 
the character, but sometimes the character with whom we identify, we would 
despise in real life. It is possible that both kinds of experience inspire compassion 
and develop our moral capacities. 
The primary goal of this dissertation is to make a contribution to ethicism, the 
view that ethical considerations have aesthetic relevance. My analysis of empathy 
will be valuable toward that end,  since it often takes an aesthetic form and has 
moral content and consequences. Empathy has been widely discussed in 
aesthetics, because it accounts for one of the reasons we value literature. I think it 
is an important topic for at least two reasons. First, applying theories of empathy 
can enrich our experiences with artworks. But more importantly, the mechanisms 
of aesthetic empathy are extremely relevant to society. If the way we relate to 
fictional characters affects our relationships with people, the ethical implications 
are obvious. I do not pretend to prove such a hypothesis. I do intend to explore the 
 	  
 
probable effects, negative and positive, given that there is some relationship 
between our experience with fictional characters and our experience with each 
other. 
Philosophers working on empathy have not focused on jokes and I will see if 
their theories are adequate to explain the affect of racist jokes in particular. While 
existing theories do articulate the ways we empathize with characters, they do not 
satisfactorily account for the way our engagement with artworks can preclude 
empathy. What I mean is that these theories do not satisfactorily address points of 
view not included in "fellow-feeling."  Racist jokes, especially what I shall 
identify as ironic racist jokes, br ing this out in a helpful way, and empathy (or 
lack there-of) plays an important role in evaluating ironic racist jokes. 
My hypothesis is that ironic racist jokes put their audience in a position that is 
at odds with the kind of compassionate fellow feeling characteristic of empathy as 
it has been described. My work will also more clearly distinguish empathy from 
identification and sympathy. I will argue that the self-protective irony at work in 
racist joke-telling damages our moral capacities in a way that mirrors the way that 
aesthetic empathy benefits these capacities. 
 
Jokes and empathy 
There is a trend among my friends to tell jokes that could easily offend. The 
people I have in mind are not blatantly racist. On the contrary, they seem to be 
liberal, fair-minded individuals who protest war, disdain apartheid, and vote for 
 	  
 
the Green party. They claim to tell racist jokes with a sense of irony. In other 
words, when they tell a racist joke, the joke is allegedly a joke on the sort of racist 
that would tell such a joke without a sense of irony. Furthermore, the listener must 
infer that the teller intends to make fun of anyone that could be such an ignorant 
bigot. The success of an ironic racist joke depends in part on the appropriate 
audience uptake. Here is a generic joke on a racist: 
"How many "X's" does it take to change a light bulb? 
 
--A whole lot, because they are so dirty and stupid." 
 
In this case, it is easy to see that the joke is on the person thinking that for any X, 
if X is any race but my own, X is dirty and stupid. It is a joke about racist jokes. 
My friends maintain that their jokes are told in the same spirit. 
In contrast to the joke on the racist, here is a racist joke devoid of irony: 
"How do you keep blacks out of your backyard? 
--Hang one in your front yard." 
 
 
 
This joke is reportedly funny to some people. It is what Ted Cohen calls a 
conditional hermetic joke in that it requires particular knowledge and a certain 
disposition, in this case prejudice. 1 Cohen defines a joke as conditional if it will 
only work with a certain audience, an audience that must supply something (the 
condition on which the joke depends) in order to get the joke. The joke is hermetic 
 
 
1  Cohen, "Jokes" Eva Schaper, ed. Pleasure, preference and value; Studies in philosophical  aesthetics. 
Cambridge University Press, 1983, 131. 
 	  
 
to the extent that it requires arcane background knowledge. 2   For this joke, the 
knowledge required would be something along the lines of your not wanting black 
people in your neighborhood (i.e. your "backyard") and knowing the history we 
have of lynching black people in  this country. If this joke is told within a 
community of prejudiced people, it could strengthen the bond between them. 
Hermetic conditional jokes tend to reinforce intimacy because they call on some 
shared disposition. In other words, when I tell a joke that you find funny, we 
establish that you and I have something in common. Furthermore, since this joke 
will not be funny to some people, it establishes an exclusive community. 
For this dissertation, I will assume that racism itself is an undesirable, immoral 
characteristic. I do not intend to argue for this point. Instead, I want to establish at 
least some conditions for a joke to express racism and then consider the affect of 
racist jokes, especially those told ironically. Now it may be nothing new to say 
that racist jokes are bad. However, in light of the current backlash against political 
correctness, I believe that renewed reflection on the subject is appropriate. 3  Ted 
Cohen's article and subsequent book Jokes, handles the logical and aesthetic 
aspects of jokes in general, but leaves racist jokes largely untouched. While he 
does mention racist jokes, he does not consider the aspects I find most interesting 
and important:  irony and empathy. 
 
 
 
 
2 Jokes: Philosophical  Thoughts on Joking Matters. University of Chicago Press, 1999, 13. 
3 Much of this analysis will apply equally well in the case of sexist and homophobic jokes. 
 	  
 
In this chapter, I will argue that ironic racist jokes (jokes allegedly on the racist) 
share features with racist jokes that establish them as unethical. Often, when 
someone tells a joke intended to be ironic, people are uncomfortable even if they 
see that the joke is intended to be ironic. I think that this reaction comes from the 
way jokes situate their audience for an appropriate aesthetic response . The listener 
is asked to identify with the racist in order to make the inferences needed to 
understand the joke . One problem here is that empathy (which I will argues begins 
as identification) leads us to appreciate someone's position.4   Racism is obviously 
not a position we should be appreciating. Also, the racist jokes can be disturbing if 
we are not sure they are completely ironic. In addition, there may be an element of 
self-protective irony (I explain this in Chapter 4) in use by the joke teller. As I 
have indicated the joke tellers make a claim about irony. If they are wrong, then 
perhaps they are racist or at least engaging in racist behavior. 
Recently, a person at an ASA conference commented, "I wouldn't want to live in a 
world with no offensive jokes."  Indeed Ted Cohen makes a similar observation in 
his book Jokes: Philosophical Thoughts on Joking Matters: "I have come to realize 
that if there is a problem with such [racist] jokes, the problem is compounded 
exactly by the fact that they are funny. Face that fact."5   These statements reveal a 
mistrust of censorship, but they also suggest that as long as a joke is funny, then it 
need not be moral. They may suggest that being offended can be good for us. 
 
4 I discuss the relationship between empathy and identification more fully in chapter 2. 
5 Cohen, Jokes 84. 
 	  
 
Primarily, I think they express the attitude that humor is among our most guarded 
and prized values. We might give up a lot of laughter if we lose the offensive 
jokes. 
However, in an earlier article, Cohen does a nice job explaining the 
unacceptability of some jokes: 
Suppose that prejudice against P's is a bad thing, and that to be amused 
by an x-joke requires a disposition which is related to anti-P prejudice, 
although that disposition is not itself a prejudice. The joke will be 
accessible only to those who either have the disposition or can, in 
imagination, respond as if they had it. ..It will be fundamentally 
parochial if there are people who cannot find it accessible. What people 
will be in this position? P's, I think. Even the imagined possession of 
the disposition is in conflict with what makes these people P's.6 
 
Cohen recognizes here that I cannot find a joke funny if in so doing I must 
forsake an essential part of who I am-my race or gender for example. I would 
add that there are others that could not appreciate the joke even if, unlike me, they 
need not forsake some essential part of themselves to do so. The joke is 
exclusionary and so those empathetic with P's will also not enjoy the joke. In this 
case, the imagined possession of the disposition is in conflict with empathy for 
P's. 
On the one hand, we want and need to have laughter in our lives. On the other 
hand, we think it is sometimes not worth the damaging effects. As such, it is 
understandable that Cohen's ambivalence should be prevalent. Compare the quote 
above to a comment in his later book:  "I insist that you not let your conviction 
 
 
6 Cohen, "Jokes" 131. 
 	  
 
that a joke is in bad taste, or downright immoral, blind you to whether you find it 
funny."7  Cohen's position changes substantially here. The importance of humor 
takes emphasis over any other value. In spite of his former insight into the 
unacceptability of these jokes, he decides that "my complaint that such jokes are in 
bad taste or unwholesome comes to nothing more than my wish to be made free of 
them."8   He goes on to assert that if it were true that such jokes are symptoms of 
pernicious beliefs or that the jokes caused such perniciousness, it would warrant a 
moral objection. However, he concludes that no one can know or show that this is 
true. Contemporary moral theories would require proof that a joke produce 
genuine harm or that it reduces the moral character of those trafficking in them. 
Since no moral theory can be invoked, he argues, we cannot condemn the joke. 
I intend to flesh out Cohen's earlier argument for the immorality of some jokes 
in spite of his more recent retraction. In the 1983 paper, Cohen describes a case in 
which a person is unable to find humor in a joke: 
She cannot bring her sense of humor to that joke without 
imaginatively taking on a disposition which is incompatible with her 
conception of herself as a woman or a certain kind of woman . ..she 
cannot reach the joke without a hideous cost.9 
 
"Imaginatively taking on a disposition" here involves identifying with a point of 
view that diminishes one's self-esteem. Although Cohen maintains that the only 
person in this role is the person about whom the joke is made, I believe this 
 
 
7 Cohen, Jokes 83. 
8 Jokes 79 . 
9 Cohen, "Jokes" 134. 
 	  
 
position is equally tenable for empathetic listeners. This listener's identity (race, 
gender role, etc) is not demeaned, but he or she identifies with the person who is at 
odds with the joke, whose self-esteem or identity is demeaned. This 
compassionate identification does not leave room for humor. 
 
Inthe previous case, the listener identified with the person that the joke is on. 
However, when a joke is ironic, it requires its audience to imaginatively take on 
the mindset of a racist. As such, it brings its audience to make connections at odd 
with the kind of empathy I have described. An example may help here. Consider 
the following joke. It will require some background explanation. When I first 
came to the philosophy department and was introduced as "Tanya Rodriguez," one 
of my colleagues informed me that he once dated a Mexican girl. I am not sure 
what his point was, but it was offensive in several ways. First, he was suggesting 
that he was cool with Mexicans and that I could consider him a friend. Perhaps he 
thought this information would establish an intimacy between us. Second, since I 
am Puerto Rican, his comment ignored any relevant difference between Mexicans 
and Puerto Ricans. Third, I am not a "girl" and fourthly, his comment implies that 
being a fellow graduate student is like being on a date. Upon hearing of this 
exchange, many people in the department were annoyed (even more than I). Since 
then, people have referred to this event by mentioning my alleged "Mexican 
heritage." It is usually amusing, a joke on the person that made the original 
mistake. For example, a colleague recently asked, "Why aren't you dressed up for 
 	  
 
Cinco de Mayo?"  This made me smile and remember that initial introduction to 
the philosophy department. Another day I was sitting at a computer working, when 
a colleague asked what I was doing: 
"I'm working on a fellowship application." 
 
--"Is it some kind of special fellowship for Mexicans?" 
 
Supposedly this was a joke ironically referring to that initial event with the other 
colleague. The problem was that this person suggested that I could only be 
working on a "special fellowship" application. I felt immediately alienated. My 
capabilities were in question. In order to laugh, I would have to set aside the 
suggestion I was an Affirmative Action case. I would also have to ignore the 
resentment on behalf of my colleague that such "special fellowships" existed (he 
and I had discussed the topic before). I was not amused. In fact, I was deeply hurt 
by this comment. However, others in the department thought it was funny. 
Let us consider another example. In his book, Cohen provides the following racist 
joke: 
"How did a passerby stop a group of black men from committing a 
gang rape? 
 
--He threw them a basketball." 
 
One does not need to be a black man to find this joke sad, offensive, and painful. It 
is sad that people hold such horrendous stereotypes; it is offensive that people 
would make light of such stereotypes, and it is painful when one imaginatively 
takes on the feelings of the person whose identity is at odds with the joke. In 
11 	  
 
chapter five, I give an example of how racist jokes slip from the seemingly 
innocuous to the deeply offensive. This particular joke falls in with the obviously 
offensive and some will maintain that not all racist jokes are in this category. Yet, 
if we can identify and feel for someone that has been the subject of painful racist 
joking, it becomes clear why we should avoid them altogether.  However, Cohen 
holds that a personal reaction does not establish the immorality of the joke: 
This does not mean that it is unreal, that you should persist in telling 
me such jokes on the grounds that is only a personal, subjective 
matter that they do not agree with me, but it would mean that my 
complaint that such jokes are in bad taste or unwholesome comes to 
nothing more than my wish to be free of them. That is pretty much 
how it is for me, for instance, with regard to the music of Wagner 
and some of Eliot's poetry. I do not claim that these works are poor 
or corrupt, but only that I do not care for them; and if you do care for 
them, then this may mark a significant difference between you and 
me, but it signals nothing I am prepared to say about the works in 
themselves. 10 
 
So according to Cohen, I cannot condemn the joke in itself; I may merely assert 
my wish to be free of it. One reason for his position is that Cohen believes it is 
impossible to show a connection between exchanging racist jokes and negative 
beliefs about groups of people. 11   He argues that the jokes don't say anything 
about a group of people, because they are like fictions. 
Many people cringe at the suggestion that the immorality of racist jokes stems 
from propagating stereotypes. People are dissatisfied with this stock objection to 
racist jokes and say that there is no proof that such jokes propagate stereotypes. 
 
 
1Cohen, Jokes 79. 
11 Jokes 78. 
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Let us suppose that racist jokes do not "propagate stereotypes" since, as Cohen 
points out, this is a universal claim that is difficult to establish. 1  There are at least 
two problems in addition to stereotyping that deserve attention.   When a racist 
joke about someone of my race is told in my presence, there are two ways it could 
be interpreted. On one hand, racist jokes cheat people of their individuality, 
anonymously grouping me with all people of a "type." On the other hand, when a 
person tells a racist joke and means to exclude me, they disrespect my cultural 
identification.  Consider a recent situation. A group of people talking comes to the 
topic of philosophy list-serves. Someone says, '"'They should call 'Hisp-list' 
'Spic-list."' Now, if the joke tellers in this situation do not include me in their joke 
(it is laughter about Latino philosophers in general, not me personally) their 
exclusion is in bad faith. 12 It is in bad faith because there is no obvious reason to 
exclude me from that group except that I am present. Furthermore, I do not want 
to be excluded from a group with whom I identify.  This is an important point to 
recognize. Many people grow frustrated with discussions of race. They would like 
to throw out the concept altogether. What we must realize as philosophers is that 
an analysis of race is necessary because it results from a fact about the world. 
People identify and are identified in terms of race. 13  Thus it makes sense to clarify 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 This is a common practice of people that hold prejudices. For example, my maternal grandmother did not 
approve of "mixing the races." However, she managed to accept me by imagining that my father was 
descended from Mayan royalty! 
13 Jorge Gracia made this comment at the APA annual meeting, 2005. 
12 	  
 
the that identification if we want to make progress with respect to empathy and 
racial difference. 14 
I would like to reconsider a joke I mentioned earlier: 
"How do you keep blacks out of your backyard? 
--Hang one in your front yard." 
 
Cohen would categorize a joke like this as conditional and hermetic. Consider the 
listener who does not have the necessary background; how would this person have 
access to the joke?  I think such a person would not have access without concerted 
effort. For example, I had to think about the person that told me the joke. He 
comes from a largely segregated Italian community. After long reflection, I 
recalled hearing an old man on television worrying about undesirables moving 
into their backyard. I finally noticed the double meaning of 'backyard' (literal and 
figurative). Adding to the joke's sinister subtext, I was reminded of our history in 
the U.S. of lynching black people. Finally, there is an air of nostalgia in this joke. 
As a result, getting the joke involves imaginatively taking on the position of a 
person reminiscing about this past. I believe this is a dangerous practice. 
If one simulates racist attitudes when one tells or appreciates racist jokes, the 
immorality of such jokes should be apparent. Notice that when people laugh at 
racist jokes , even when they are told ironically, they often feel uncomfortable. For 
example, when the ironic "special fellowship" joke was told, a few people 
 
 
 
14 I will focus on this aspect of race in chapter three. 
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listening sitting nearby laughed, and one of these laughing people said, "That's 
just wrong." Why should someone that finds a joke immoral be simultaneously 
laughing? There is a shift in identification that allows one to follow the logic of 
the joke. The source of guilt may arise from the fact that one is aware of the 
necessary assumptions to "get" the joke. Perhaps catching the implications too 
easily directs makes that person self-conscious about making racist inferences. 
 
Defending Aesthetic Ethicism 
 
I have argued that empathy with marginalized people will interfere with finding 
humor in at least some racist jokes, ironic or otherwise. One objection implicit in 
scenarios laid out in conversations I have had is that they, though themselves not 
racist, sometimes find immoral jokes, including racist ones, very humorous. I have 
argued that this results not from their own inherent evil, but because they lack 
empathy for those at the "butt" of the joke. They might respond that they do not 
demonstrate racism in their actions. It seems to me that there is a denial of the real 
nature of their response to a racist joke. In other words they feel detached from 
concerns of the real world within the joke-world. The claim is that when one is 
"just joking" one doesn't really believe the ideas one entertains. One is detached 
from real world concerns much like the detached appreciation some prescribe for 
any purely aesthetic response. 
Most famously, Kant argues that the appreciation of true beauty was free from 
 
concerns that the admired even exists. Whether the object of aesthetic appreciation 
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is also moral, true, etc. are questions beyond the aesthetic judgment. When people 
appeal to the "just a joke" -type defense, they insist that a response is and should be 
free from real-world concerns just as the formalists do when they restrict the 
audience to narrow categories of aesthetic relevance. For them, in the case of a 
racist joke, real-world oppression is not a relevant or an appropriate factor in 
appreciation or lack there-of. As Ted Cohen directs: 
"Wish that there were no mean jokes. Try remaking the world so that such jokes 
will have no place, will not arise. But do not deny that they are funny. That denial 
is a pretense that will help nothing" (Jokes 84). 
Here Cohen sets humor apart from the moral. To describe a joke as 'wrong' or 
'mean' is labeled an inappropriate aesthetic response. 
Cohen's insistence that we in fact recognize humor in certain jokes demands that 
we engage in one of these formalist approaches. While he recognizes that some 
jokes are objectionable, he sees a problem in pinpointing the actual moral defect: 
"First is the problem of finding a basis for any moral judgment passed upon 
fiction, and then there is the problem of establishing the impropriety of laughing at 
something especially when the something is fictional" (Jokes 75). This problem is 
clarified by my own theory of empathy and I will discuss this in more detail as we 
continue. At this point, however, I simply want to draw attention to the formalist 
assumptions at work in Cohen's separation of ethical criticism from aesthetic 
judgments of jokes. Finding a basis for a moral judgment of any fiction is for him 
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suspect.Cohen's attitude is born out in conversations more generally. People will 
agree that certain jokes should not be told in front of certain people, by certain 
people, or on certain occasions. But there is a prevailing resistance to the notion 
that it is wrong to tell a joke when these conditions fall away. For example, people 
ask me what the harm is in two close friends, both opponents of actual oppression, 
exchanging jokes that could hurt certain people, given that there is no chance that 
any such people would hear it. Appreciation in such a case is based on the uptake 
required of the hearer, intimacy established between the parties and perhaps the 
pleasure of relief in laughing at something unpleasant. None of these responses 
seems wrong. Such attention to the enjoyment of our response, detached from the 
thing to which we respond and the context that allows that thing to exist, is 
precisely characteristic of the formalist project. 
Formalist views of interpretation and evaluation insisting on the separation of 
moral and aesthetic value have been very influential. Not everyone, however, 
thinks the inclusion of ethical considerations is inappropriate. Berys Gaut, for 
example, outlines the objections to formalism in "The Ethical Criticism of Art." 
Interestingly, Gaut's objections give the impression of being aligned in exact 
opposition to Cohen's separation of humor from ethical evaluation. Gaut 
characterizes the formalist position as follows: 
There is an aesthetic attitude in terms of which we aesthetically 
evaluate works: this aesthetic attitude is distinct from the ethical 
attitude we may adopt toward works; this aesthetic attitude is distinct 
from the ethical attitude we may adopt toward works; and ethical 
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assessment is never a concern of the aesthetic attitude. So the ethical 
criticism of works is irrelevant to their aesthetic value. 15 
 
Gaut describes two sorts of justification for this position. One classic formalist 
approach describes a work's intrinsic properties as the only appropriate focus of 
aesthetic attention. The work of art is free even from its own context on this view. 
Another makes detachment characteristic of the aesthetic attitude. Particularly in 
the case of fiction, the aesthetic response is coupled with our knowledge that we 
have some control in our actual lives. Some argue that this feature enables us to 
appreciate tragedy. 16 For example, we enjoy our response of sadness knowing that 
we can leave it behind when we leave the fiction and return to our lives. 
If we think of jokes as short stories (Cohen's description) then there is supposedly 
no point in practical ethical objections, for we have no influence over a fictional 
joke-world that does not exist. However, Gaut makes an important criticism of this 
view: "The step from the claim that the will is disengaged and therefore that 
ethical assessment has no role to play does not follow: there is similarly no 
possibility of altering historical events, and we are in this sense forced to have a 
detached or contemplative attitude toward them, but we still ethically assess 
historical characters and actions" (Gaut 186) We engage with history to enlighten 
the present and we can engage with fiction in the same way. 17  Similarly, even if 
 
 
 
 
15  Gaut, Berys. "The Ethical Criticism of Art" Ed. Jerrold Levinson. Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the 
Intersection. Cambridge University Press,  1998. 
16 I attend to the notion of control and appreciation in chapter two . 
17 Aristotle held a similar view as well . He believed the pleasure of tragedy came from its special capacity 
for teaching us to be better people. 
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we cannot prove that a morally objectionable joke has negative real-world 
consequences beyond its performance; our engagement with them is subject to 
ethical scrutiny. 18 
I think what Gaut has in mind is something like this: It  would be reasonable to 
admonish a person for misrepresenting slavery (for example) as a natural (or 
useful or whatever) practice even if one could not show that the misrepresentation 
had any consequences. However, one can object based on the moral superiority of 
honesty-slavery is a real world event and lying about it is harm to those being 
lied to. Also, one hopes that understanding historical events and their moral import 
will enlighten our current practices and even our feelings about those practices. 19 
Now consider a novel that dramatizes the antebellum south. One might criticize it 
for a sentimental tone or inaccurate descriptions of the problems. Here again the 
moral failing would be one against truth or reality. Anything more (detrimental 
effect on society etc.) would be difficult to establish. Since the subject is fictional, 
it doesn't make sense to simply condemn it based on its truth value. If we did so 
most novels would be immoral, since the characters would be fictions and the 
description of their activities and thoughts thus a collection of lies. 
David Pole argues that immorality in artworks creates internal incoherence and 
therefore constitutes a formal defect. Gaut is critical of Pole's attempt to derive 
ethicism from formalism, but I want to point out that (even if sound) this argument 
18 By 'engagement' I include use, performance,  discussion, and response or uptake. 
19 Gaut makes a similar observation about history and its relevance to our response to artworks in "The 
Ethical Criticism of Art" 186. 
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for formal ethicism will not be work for jokes. In fact, jokes capitalize on internal 
incoherence. Consider this joke found in Truly Tasteless Jokes: 
"Why didn't the black man want to marry a Mexican?" 
 
"--He didn't want the kids to grow up too lazy to steal."20 
 
One could hardly condemn this joke based solely upon the incongruent ending. 
The formal structure depends on the twist, an answer that isn't reasonable. 
Laughter is prescribed by the irrational conclusion. Poor logic is often utilized for 
the sake of humor. So with jokes, we are ensnared by more problems than arise 
with the ordinary fictions Pole takes into account. In other words, when it comes 
to finding a basis for ethical criticism that is aesthetically relevant to humor, the 
internal incoherence argument falls short. Gaut suggests the "merited response 
argument" to answer an additional shortcoming in Pole's formal ethicism- 
artworks with internally coherent ethical flaws. He points to Triumph of the Will 
as an example of a work that is consistently unethical.21   When a work prescribes 
an aesthetic response that not merited, Gaut identifies it as an aesthetic defect 
without reference to consistency or lack-there-of. His examples include "comedies 
that are not amusing, melodramas that do not merit sadness and pity" and so on.22 
Ifa tragic love story is more comical than poignant, it is probably aesthetically 
flawed. Artistic genres are the clearest way that works prescribe a particular 
aesthetic response. However, quality of response is indicated by artworks in 
20 Blanche Knot, ed. Truly Tasteless Joke (Ballentine 1982) 35. 
21  Gaut, "The Ethical Criticism of Art" 191. 
22  Gaut 192. 
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addition to the kind of response:  "We are also concerned not just with whether a 
response occurs, but with the quality of that response: humor may be crude, 
unimaginative, or flat, or may be revelatory, profound, or inspiring"23 Consider 
Gaut's 'merited response argument' applied to the case of racist joking. Jokes 
 
prescribe humor (by definition) and stereotyping is unimaginative (also by 
definition). Thus, even if a racist joke manipulates its audience to laugh, the 
quality of amusement should also be evaluated. Gaut writes, 
The aesthetic relevance of prescribed responses wins further support 
from noting that much of the value of art derives from its 
deployment of an affective mode of cognition-derives from the 
way works teach us, not by giving us merely intellectual knowledge 
but by bringing that knowledge home to us. This teaching is not just 
about how the world is, but can reveal new conceptions of the world 
in the light of which we can experience our situation, can teach us 
new ideals, can impart new concepts and discriminatory skills- 
having read Dickens, we can recognize the Micawbers of the world. 
And the way knowledge is brought home to us is by making it 
vividly present, so disposing us to reorder our thoughts, feelings, and 
motivations in the light of it.24 
 
Interestingly, ironic racist jokes introduce another level of difficulty. It  would 
 
seem that they must specifically prescribe revelatory humor, which will be merited 
depending upon their success. I will discuss this in detail in chapter four.  It isn't 
enough to rely on formalist arguments that claim ethical considerations are 
irrelevant to aesthetic response because ethicists have made arguments to which  
the formalists must respond. The case of racist jokes gives another take on 
 
 
 
23  Gaut 195. 
24 Ibid. 
 	  
 
arguments between ethicism and formalism even if we categorize them as little 
fictions.25 
What then, do we appreciate in the form of humor we categorize as jokes?  What 
is relevant to a judgment of a joke's aesthetic merit?  Ted Cohen's directs his 
attention to devices for achieving intimacy. A Polish or Irish joke in which it 
really matters that the character is Polish or Irish is that such jokes require more of 
the hearer, involve him more intimately, and give him a greater opportunity for 
self-congratulation in his appreciation of the joke. 26   On Cohen 's view then, the 
devices a joke employs to achieve intimacy are relevant to its appreciation. On the 
other hand, a joke that employs self-protective irony stands in the way of intimacy. 
If so, it follows that role of self-protective irony in joking must also be relevant to 
its appreciation. 27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 Racism is generally unimaginative and racist jokes generally dull, but this has more to do with the nature 
of racism. I will tackle the issue in chapter 3. 
26 Jokes, 75. 
 	  
 
II 
Recognizing Race 
Invention/ Imagination! Identification 
 
 
In this chapter, I develop my view of aesthetic empathy and identification with 
respect to race. Representations of race in fiction play an important role in human 
empathy and in imaginative self-identification. Race theorists have indicated that 
more work needs to be done on this topic and I hope to contribute here. 
Furthermore, I believe that the work started by race theorists can improve our 
understanding of emotional engagement with fictions in general. As such, analysis 
here supports a defense of ethicism by accounting for the way stories dealing with 
race affect their audiences. In order for this chapter to serve its function in my 
overall project and establish its philosophical niche, I will argue the following: 
1. 'Race' must be recognized as a meaningful concept, one that has 
consequences for current debates in ethics and aesthetics (Section I) 
2. My view of aesthetic empathy and identification contributes to race 
theory by focusing much needed attention on the subjective experience 
of race. (Section II) 
3. An adequate of account of empathy must consider aesthetic affect with 
respect to race, as my analysis of racist joking makes evident. (Section 
III) 
 	  
 
4. The role of imaginative identification in race theory speaks to 
problems I see in the recent discussion of identification and empathy in 
analytic aesthetics. (Section III) 
Ultimately, I draw upon work done by race theorists to support my thesis-that 
recognition, identification, and empathy have artistic value deriving from moral 
content. 
 
I: Inventing Race 
 
Using a term like 'race,' that has generally been well established as having no 
basis in biology, needs some justification. Anthony Appiah argues that we cannot 
understand American social distinctions in terms of race. He believes that in order 
to move beyond racism we first must abandon racial identities altogether. 1 
Appiah's work is central to the current debate over the race-concept. As his 
position on identity in particular directly contradicts my view, I feel compelled to 
provide an accurate, though brief, account of his reasoning. I will set aside his 
argument against biological essentialism, since I do not take issue with it. 
 
Appiah believes that the notion of race offers nothing to the quest for knowledge. 
Even as a social descriptor, the race-concept quickly breaks down. It is notoriously 
vague . ..2 
 
 
 
 
1 K. Anthony Appiah. Race, Culture, Identity Color conscious: the political morality of race /K. Anthony 
Appiah and Amy Gutmann. Publisher  Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, c1996. 32. 
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In his paper, "Who Invented the Concept of Race," Bernasconi argues that 
understanding the history of the race-concept allows a better understanding of 
current racial practice. Originally, people used the term 'race' to square the biblical 
story of human creation with newly discovered people bearing little family 
resemblance to Europeans. Some people reacted by claiming that non-whites are 
not human at all; since they could not be descended from Adam and Eve who were 
(apparently) white!  Others argued that Genesis tells only one creation story 
among many, a view called polygenesis. On this view, God created Adam and 
Eve, but they were the ancestors of white European-types only. God created other 
couples in other lands that gave rise to the exotic people described by world 
travelers . So diversity among people was explained by unrelated lineage. On 
Bernasconi 's account, Isaac La Peyrere offered the initial theory of polygenesis. 
For La Peyrere, polygenesis had the advantage of explaining different kinds of 
people while identifying all of them as God's children, even if they were not 
descended from Adam and Eve. Accordingly, he hoped his view would encourage 
better treatment of Jews. Unfortunately, quite the reverse was true; the theory of 
polygenesis was soon appropriated in support of slavery. Polygenesis was not 
widely accepted, however, since it contradicted the Bible.3 
Immanuel Kant went to great lengths to defend biblical authority and the belief 
that Adam and Eve were parents to all people. He believed that environmental 
 
 
 
3 Bernasconi, Robert, ed. Race. Blackwell Publishers, 2001 : 18. 
 	  
 
factors activated latent traits inherent to all, thus explaining physical variation 
within a single kind. Once activated, these traits were hereditary and permanently 
imprinted on subsequent offspring. Kant introduced the term 'race' to denote 
difference within the species, referring mainly to skin color as the distinguishing 
trait. In Kant's words: "Races are deviations that are constantly preserved over 
many generations and come about as a consequence of migration . . .or through 
interbreeding with other deviations of the same line of descent, which always 
produces half-breed off-spring." 4  Defining race in these terms (environmentally 
 
activated hereditary variation among descendants of a single line) allowed Kant to 
answer the challenge of diversity and adhere to the Biblical account of human 
creation. While Kant's definition affirms the brotherhood of all people regardless 
of skin color, Bernasconi argues that its main appeal was adherence to Christian 
monogenesis. Polygenesis (the creation of more than one original pair) disputes 
the story of Adam and Eve as the only parents to human kind. 
Bernasconi emphasizes that neither explanation of human origin necessarily 
supports a particular stance on the slavery issue: 
Within the context of the late eighteenth century the idea of race was 
a resource for those who opposed slavery, just as polygenesis lent 
itself to the upholders of slavery without there being any necessary 
connection between one's position on the mono-genesis-polygenesis 
dispute and one's position on slavery. Nevertheless, none of this 
means there was not a strong connection between the concept of race 
and racism"5 
 
 
 
4  Kant, Immanuel. "Of the Different Human Races." in Race, Bernasconi Ed., 9 . 
5 Bernasconi 21. 
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I think it is important to appreciate Bemasconi's point here. Although the 
theory was first articulated to combat illtreatment of non-white people, slave 
owners for theoretical support of their trade appropriated polygenesis. In other 
words, polygenesis has been used to support oppression and it has been used to 
fight oppression. Thus, polygenesis is not intrinsically racist or hateful toward a 
particular group. Conversely, Kant introduced the race-concept to combat 
polygenesis and some people appropriated it to counter certain arguments for 
slavery. However, this use is only one of many consequences. The mere origin of 
a term does not determine its worth nor its meaning. For that reason, I want to 
emphasize that even though historically 'race' was used to challenge the morality 
of slavery, we cannot immediately conclude that the race-concept is not racist. In 
other words, just as the theory of polygenesis does not oblige its subscribers to 
endorse slavery, it should be clear that the race-concept in itself does not entail 
respect for all people. As Bernasconi points out, the concept of race has strong ties 
to racism even though its origin was not hateful in spirit. While the origin of 'race' 
is a good starting point in its evaluation, I believe we must seek further 
justification for its use. 
 
 
II: Racial Identification in Current Theory 
 
First, I want to point out that I am setting out the case for maintaining the race- 
concept rather than promoting the conservation of any particular race. In other 
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words, my interest here is to argue that the race-concept serves a practical purpose 
in race relations and social progress. However, I am not suggesting that we should 
develop or maintain distinct racial groups. This distinction is not always obvious 
in the literature on race. Du Bois, for example, argued that African-Americans 
should preserve their racial identity for the sake of cultural progress. He objected 
to the notion that progress should require people to lose racial identity "in the 
commingled blood of the nation."6   I agree with Dubois on this point-eliminating 
 
difference through "intermarriage" is a poor solution to social inequality. I also do 
not think it should be necessary to deny racial differences for the sake of comfort. 
However, Du Bois believed that each race has a particular message and if racial 
distinctions disappear, that message will disappear. This attention to the physical 
aspect of race has led some to accuse Du Bois of asserting a biological racial 
essence. 
Tommy Lott, however, makes it clear that Du Bois was mainly concerned with 
revising the race-concept to throw out any basis in biological essentialism. 
Philosophers including Ron Sundstrom, Robert Gooding-Williams, and Linda 
Martin Alcoff, give alternative direction for the meaning and use of a race-concept 
and I will outline their views here. My aim is not to propose a new theory of race 
but to show how my application of aesthetic empathy eases a tension that can be 
problematic in constructionist accounts of race. 
 
 
 
6 DuBois, "The Conservation of Races," 87. 
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A constructionist theory of race rejects biological essentialism. 
 
Constructionists about race reject biological essentialism but agree that race is 
real. They employ the race-concept in order to facilitate racial justice. However, 
there is some disagreement over the best understanding of race. However, one 
settles it; a good constructionist account would respect racial difference rather than 
denying that races exist. While most philosophers of race focus the debate on 
necessary and sufficient conditions, some do recognize the need for attention to 
the way race is experienced. Ron Sundstrom falls into this category and I will 
discuss his work. Additionally, Linda Alcoff has suggested literature as a means 
for understanding race and this suggestion motivates my work here. I intend to 
develop constructivist race theory by attending to race via aesthetic emotion. 
Accordingly, I tum now toward an explication of the constructionist landscape as 
given in current literature. 
Ron Sundstrom's work deals with the ontology of race and the debate 
preservation of the race-concept. He classifies race as a social identity like gender, 
class, and sexuality. Sundstrom argues for the importance of race by describing its 
extensive impact on our lives and on our society. For Sundstrom, there is a 
mutually determining influence between society and social identity. While he 
hopes for a future without race, he recognizes it as a real social presence. As a 
result, Sundstrom argues, we must hold on to "race" in order to identify racism. 
However, he thinks the concept requires careful management to prevent misuse: 
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"society ought to regard it with irony, a position which expresses a socially critical 
perspective and distance from social categories."7  To this end, Sundstrom uses 
double quotation marks ("race") to signify his reservation for using the term. In 
addition, Sundstrom believes this marking alerts the reader to be skeptical and 
avoid complacence for the term. While I do not adopt this technique, I appreciate 
the feeling behind it. In other words, I agree with Sundstrom's view that using the 
race-concept should not promote its unquestioned acceptance. 
Sundstrom objects to what he and others call nominalism about race. 
 
Nominalism is the view that considers as real only those kinds that designate 
natural, biologically related categories. His criticism is particularly relevant to my 
use of the race-concept. Contra Appiah, Sundstrom rejects the claim that race is an 
illusion or myth because he thinks such a conception of race undermines the role it 
plays in political and social life. It precludes reference to rights based on group 
organization, such as calls for retributive justice. 8  By casting doubt on the race- 
 
concept, race becomes an unjustified category in political discussion. As a result, 
race is thought to be nothing more than illusion and any reference to it is nonsense. 
One cannot use the race-concept if it has been debunked as having no explanatory 
value. In highlighting a particular disparity among incoming graduates, for 
example, the race-concept can direct attention to neglected issues. Similarly, if we 
refused to acknowledge differences between men and women, it would not make 
7 Sundstrom, Rending the Veil: A Critical Look at the Ontology & Conservation of "Race" 3. 
8 Sundstrom credits several authors for their work on this view, including Houston Baker, Henry Louis 
Gates Jr., Leonard Harris, Paul Gilroy, and Michael Root. 
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sense to point out analogous discrepancies in education. 9  Along these lines 
Sundstrom writes, "We need to be able to point to it, and discover what it is and 
the role it plays in our lives."10 
Understanding the reality of race requires a look beyond the classifications 
used in the physical sciences. Sundstrom points to the kinds identified by social 
sciences. These categories are used to explain social organization and behavior 
based on norms rather than causal law. Sundstrom argues that human history can 
only be understood properly in terms of social organization. By way of example, 
Sundstrom suggests some questions that require this approach: '"Why did John 
Brown raid Harpers Ferry?'  Why did Susan B. Anthony need to seek the 
franchise for women in the U.S.?"' 11  Clearly, it makes no sense to reject the 
explanatory value of the race-concept for social phenomena. 
Sundstrom's account of race rejects the notion of racial essence without 
denying the reality of racial identity. This diverges from Appiah's view that the 
race-concept dictates group identification based on fundamental nature or essence. 
Sundstrom bases his analysis on the more general philosophical debate over 
realism. He focuses on the metaphysical status of kinds and argues that there is 
more than one way for kinds to be real. He describes the necessary conditions for 
the assertion that race refers to "a real human kind" and argues that these 
 
 
 
9 I have in mind the different treatment boys and girls receive in some classes, particularly math . 
10 Sundstrom 97. 
11 Sundstrom 102. 
 	  
 
conditions are present in the United States, as they have been historically. 12  I 
think Sundstrom's approach plays an indispensable role in establishing the 
ontological status of race. He is motivated by his respect for the experience of 
race, but he shows the worth of the race-concept through a careful analysis of what 
it means. Once the meaning of the race-concept is clarified, Sundstrom shows its 
status as a legitimate social classification. His anti-essentialist view considers 
identification in terms of classification, and focuses on the socially imposed 
aspect. While this aspect is a fundamental to race, individual agency also plays a 
role in racial identification. In other words, social legislation leaves room for 
interpretation and manipulation. We cannot help but have some say in who we are 
and how we respond to society. Although Sundstrom does not explore self- 
identification in detail, he recognizes that people participate in racial construction. 
More work needs to be done on racial self-identification. Robert Gooding- 
Williams takes this issue on and makes an important clarification between the 
roles of society and agency. However, including aesthetic empathy in the 
discussion of race-identification would enrich his account. I will show that 
aesthetic empathy allows us to face racial difference without encouraging division. 
Gooding-Williams also argues for a social-constructionist theory of race, but he 
makes an interesting distinction between first-person and third-person 
identification. While he limits his discussion to black identity, I think his 
 
 
 
12 Sundstrom 105. 
16 Ibid. 
 
	  
 
distinction draws out an important issue with respect to race in general. Gooding- 
Williams, race-identification results in part from the classificatory scheme of a 
racist society. I am black if society identifies me as black. However, being a black 
person results from personal agency. Like Sundstrom, Gooding-Williams 
recognizes a collaborative relationship between society and social identity. 
However, Gooding-Williams' approach makes it plain that racial identity is not 
wholly determined for a person by clarifying the participation of the individual. 
He argues that being a black person is more than being someone society calls 
black. 13  Being black is "being racially classified as black." 14   Such racial 
classification (by society) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for black 
personhood. Becoming a black person requires an additional contribution: 
1. one begins to identify (to classify) oneself as black and 
 
2. One begins to make choices, to formulate plans, to 
express concerns, etc. in light of one's identification of 
oneself as black. 15 
 
This definition reveals an important dynamic in racial identity. On this view, 
'being black' is understood in general terms, whereas 'being a black person' must 
be recognized as having myriad interpretations. Even so, Gooding-Williams holds 
that politically, the collective aspects of being black are the most significant. 16 
 
 
 
 
13 I should mention that Gooding Williams defines the term "African-American" as those people born in 
America and classified as black. 
14 Robert Gooding-Williams, Race, Multiculturalism, and Democracy. in Race, Bernasconi Ed. 242. 
15 Robert Gooding-Williams, 243. 
 	  
If being a black person can be interpreted any number of ways, then simplistic 
Afro-centrism inhibits identification as a black person. Gooding-Williams particularly 
dislikes the Afro-centric view of black identification articulated by Molefi Asante:  "I 
embrace that which I truly know, i.e., jazz, blues, railroads ...I do not know the 
products of the other, i.e., country music, mistletoe, Valhalla . With my own products 
I can walk confidently toward the future knowing full well that I can grasp whatever 
else is out there because my own center is secured."17   In contrast to Asante, 
Gooding-Williams points to Arthur Schlesinger Jr's The Disuniting of America. He 
believes that Schlesinger also commits the error of denying complicated self-
identification. Schlesinger, however, thinks we should transcend ethnicity rather than 
let differences separate us. Gooding-Williams writes: "Where Asante seeks his 
solvent in a rhetoric of ancestral soil and biological growth, Schlesinger finds his in a 
fantastical vision of ideals."18   The alternative offered by Gooding-Williams is a more 
sophisticated multi-cultural education. I will come back to this and show how my 
view mediates the differences between Asante and Schlesinger. Before I do that, I 
look at the descriptions of identification given by Tommy Lott and Linda Martin 
Alcoff. 
In his book, The Invention of Race, Lott offers an alternative to the extremes of 
Asante and Schlesinger: "I exploit the ambiguity of Du Bois's term "invention" to 
suggest that along with the general idea that all races are political inventions, black 
 
 
17 Gooding-Williams  quoting from Asante's "Racism, Consciousness, and Afrocentricity"  142-3. 
18 Gooding-Williams  248. 
21 Ibid. 
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people have a right to invent themselves for political purposes." 19  Lott argues that 
black culture retains African characteristics. However, he maintains that black 
culture also developed as a response to racism. 
One helpful aspect of Lott's is his version of a particular model of African- 
European hybridity in which cultures evolve while preserving their heritage. He 
explains how the African part of African-American culture has been transmitted: 
There is no static African tradition frozen in time because 
remembrance of a preslave past is actively practiced inblack music 
as recurring acts of identity operating through the call and response 
mechanisms produced in the interaction of performer and audience. 
The memory of slavery itself provides the basis for what Gilroy 
refers to as "rescuing" or "redemptive" critiques. Toni Morrison's 
Beloved is a retelling of the Margaret Garner story that involves the 
construction of a social memory. "20 
 
Unlike the Afro-centric position (which roots itself in Africa without adequate 
consideration of the extent to which that even culture survived slavery), this 
hybrid model supports the view that the native land of African Americans is 
America. 21   Lott indicates how race can be genuinely connected to its historical 
source in spite being pure invention. 
Lott, drawing upon Du Bois, sees the notion of race as a necessary part of an 
agenda for racial-uplift. Du Bois gives the following definition of race: 
It is a vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and 
language, always of common history, traditions and impulses, who 
are both voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for the 
 
 
19 Lott, Tommy L. The Invention of Race: Black Culture and the Politics of Representation. Blackwell, 
1999. 
20  Lott 25. 
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accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of 
life.22 
 
Lott distinguishes between two aspects in the Du Boisian definition. In part, 
Du Bois wants dismantle the conventional meaning ofrace. However, he offers 
another version to take its place. The conventional definition of race emphasizes 
common blood, while Du Bois shifts the emphasis to non-biological aspects. Lott 
recognizes the requirement 'always of common history' as problematic, but argues 
that it fulfills its purpose: "giving voice to their aspiration for social equality by 
advancing a conception of African Americans that would allow a discussion of 
racial distinctions while accommodating the tendency of African Americans, 
under the dominating influence of racism, to want to minimize references to 
physical differences in such discussions. "23   Du Bois wanted to be able to speak 
about the needs and goals of African Americans as a group. Since the dominant 
group categorized African Americans according to a certain definition, it would be 
easier to engage that group under its own terms. The purpose of the revision was 
to shift the conversation away from the typical damaging assumptions about 
natural ability rather than to affirm biological aspects. 
Lott makes it clear that Du Bois never asserts his definition as capturing 
truth.24  Dubois understood race as an invention. As such, he thought it was 
impossible for it to be false in the straightforward sense. The important question 
 
 
22 W. E. B Du Bois, "The Conservation of Races" 491, as quoted by Lott, 48. 
23  Lott 49. 
24 Lott quotes Du Bois as consistently referring to 'race' as an invented term, its use dictated by history, 
with no biological criteria. 
 	  
 
for Du Bois and Lott alike is whether the definition serves the purpose of social 
progress. While I agree that the function of the race-concept must be our main 
concern, this understanding invites some difficulties. In other words, one reason 
for arguing about the definition of race is to acknowledge the reality of race. 
Consequently, simply calling the race-concept pure invention could detract from 
the intended function. I will return to this point later in this chapter. 
Linda Martin Alcoff breathes life into the race debate, in part because she takes 
it beyond the typical black/white dichotomy. Furthermore, she points to the crucial 
role of imagination in understanding race and my work here is intended to take on 
task. Inthe next chapter, I work out the details of aesthetic imagination with 
respect to empathy and identification. For now, I will explicate Alcoff's essay on 
racial embodiment and show that her contextual theory of race calls for the work I 
do in chapter three. 
In her article, "Toward a Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment," Alcoff 
begins by outlining three general positions held by race-theorists on racial 
identification. 25 
1. Race nominalism: Race is not real because science has invalidated it as 
a meaningful biological category. The biological meaning of racial 
concepts has led to racism and so racial concepts should not be used. 
 
2. Race essentialism: Race is politically salient and the most important 
element of identity. Members of racial groups share characteristics, 
political identity, and historical destiny. 
 
 
 
 
25  Linda Martin Alcoff, "Toward a Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment" in Race, Bernasconi Ed. 
36 	  
 
3. Race contextualism: Race is socially constructed and produced through 
learned perceptual practice. Whether or not it is valid to use racial 
concepts depends on the context.26 
 
Alcoff argues that the nominalist position overlooks the multiple meanings of 
race and therefore assumes that racial concepts have no referent. The racial 
nominalist thinks that ending the use of racial concepts will at least contribute to 
ending racist practice. I must agree with Alcoff s objection on this point: we 
cannot dispose of racial terminology until we recognize its powerful underlying 
beliefs and practices. 
Essentialists about race imply that races are easily demarcated, racial 
groupings are homogenous, and ancestry determines who we are in the deepest 
sense. Understanding race this way disregards the influence of culture, and appeals 
to something like spiritual heritage. Recall Gooding-Williams' critique of Afro- 
centric essentialism. Essentialism, in that case, attempts to separate African- 
American experience from any European influence while oversimplifying African 
culture drastically. Denying the influences between cultures, according to Alcoff, 
"promotes the futile mission of opposing the tide of global hybridization." 27 On 
my understanding, however, essentialism about race is not sensible. It isn't 
 
sensible in light of global hybridization, regardless of any mission in opposition to 
it. 
 
 
 
 
26  Alcoff 270. 
27 Alcoff 270. 
 	  
 
Alcoff advocates the third view, which she calls "contextualism about race." 
On this view, "one can hold without contradiction that racialized identities are 
produced, sustained, and sometimes transformed through social beliefs and 
practices and yet that race is real, as real as anything else in lived experience, with 
operative effects in the social world. "28   This view takes into account the reality of 
racial categorization without naturalizing it. In other words, according to 
contextualism, race is real even though it does not describe a natural category. 
Alcoff s contextualism falls into the category usually labeled "constructivist."  She 
uses the label "contextualism" to emphasize the cultural framework from which 
race emerges. Race is not constructed without foundation, but in a certain 
context.29 
 
Within the contextual account, Alcoff identifies two levels, objective and 
subjective. The objective level refers to political and cultural race formation, while 
the subjective level describes everyday experience and social interaction. I view 
my project as primarily contributing to the subjective level of a contextual 
understanding of race, an area that Alcoff calls 'underdeveloped.'  My focus on 
cross-racial aesthetic empathy responds to Alcoff s call for understanding race as 
it is experienced. This will contribute to understanding empathy as well, since 
attention to race is attention to difference and navigating difference poses some 
difficult philosophical problems for empathy theorists. It is no coincidence that 
28 Ibid. 
29  I use the terms interchangeably since the contextualism is a variety of constructivism rather than an 
alternative to it. 
38 	  
 
narrative fiction supplies a mutual resource and point for comparison between 
Alcoff's work on race and work in aesthetics. Through imagination, fiction offers 
readers an opportunity to feel aspects of race left out in debate over definitions. 
Thoughts and perceptions are given in the way people have them, which is 
generally bound to emotion. I will argue (chapter three) that emotional 
involvement might be sympathetic or empathic, but follows from imaginative 
identification. Mechanical reasoning, however, does not foster inter-personal 
identification. Unfortunately, much of the philosophical work dealing with race 
focuses on definitional logic. In the "real world," however, artworks enable 
expression and formulation of identification. In other words, the arts reveal and 
influence racial identification because they affect us emotionally. Thus, my 
approach to aesthetic empathy enhances a contextual theory of race such as 
Alcoff's. 
It is significant that Alcoff does not limit the role of imaginative identification 
to understanding racial difference. Imagination plays an important role when it 
comes to racial self-identification as well.30 As I understand her view, imaginative 
self-identification helps one develop a racial identity by taking on characteristics 
of fictional character with whom we share a race-context. This allows Alcoff to 
include the agent's role in racial identity in a way that Gooding-Williams would 
appreciate. Identification is constructed in part by society, but one's reaction and 
 
 
 
30 While gender and class are not the emphasis, they are included in this theory of identification . 
 	  
 
interaction plays a constructive role as well. The socially constructed part of racial 
identity that is the shared context, but the character can contribute to that identity 
in unfamiliar ways. As a Latina for example, identifying with fictional Latina 
characters allows me to experiment with different ways of understanding myself. 
The ease of imaginative identification between reader and character will be one 
test of narrative strength and thus, aesthetic value. I might recognize 
characteristics or experiences similar to mine that I had not previously associated 
with race. Additionally, I might discover useful ways of reacting to racism in 
various circumstances. 
Clearly, narrative artistry can induce feelings and perceptions that contribute to 
self-realization. Even by itself, this provides evidence for ethicism, if one grants 
that self-realization is morally valuable. Focusing on aesthetic imagination and 
racial identity makes the moral aspect more urgent. The confusion and ambivalence 
over race in our present social context only heightens the ethical relevance         
of aesthetic identification. 
 
III: Race and the Aesthetic Imaginatiou 
 
At this point, I will defend my focus on race by clarifying its impact on current 
philosophical debates that have not adequately addressed it. I think that the 
importance of identification to understanding race suggests the importance of 
considering race when trying to understand identification in general. Similarly, it 
makes sense to focus on aesthetic identification since it is useful to the contextual 
 	  
 
theory ofrace. Narrative is of particular importance, since emotional engagement 
with narrative allows empathy with racial others. Narratives also encourage 
imaginative self-identification with respect to race and this has consequences for 
those that would discard the notion of identification altogether . 
Ifinvention is justified when it comes to racial self-identification, what is that 
grounds race? In other words, how do we maintain that the experience of race is 
real, if imagination plays a legitimate role in racial self-identification?  Lott allows 
invention for political purposes because all races are political invention anyway. 
Sundstrom's answer is less liberal; he recognizes that people participate in racial 
identification. Gooding-Williams describes racial self-invention as the personal 
interpretation of socially imposed labels. These philosophers emphasize that race 
is primarily a social product imposed upon people described as a group. As such, 
the individual person's contribution to racial identity is essentially a reaction to it. 
I do not intend to contradict these positions. I am interested in the way race 
feels; thus I focus on participation, invention, and interpretation. However, these 
aspects of racial identity are only part of the story. The concern here is that an 
identity has little meaning if anyone can claim it. There are limits to the power of 
imaginative self-identification when it comes to race. As Alcoff has said, "One 
cannot have a subjectivity that transcends the effects of public identification."31 
Furthermore, it seems that some people are not justified in claiming a certain racial 
 
 
 
31 Alcoff 78. 
 	  
 
identity. What does justify claiming a racial identity is not something I can 
determine here. However, Spike Lee's film Get on the Bus brings out some 
important aspects of the topic and I want to describe a scene that is particularly 
relevant here. 
Get on the Bus is about a group of African-American men that meet on a bus 
caravan traveling together to the Million-Man March in Washington D.C. The 
men come from all different backgrounds, differing in class, style, sexuality, 
religion, etc. Each gives some indication of why they are going to the march. 
"Flip" asks one light skinned man if he is mulatto and seems to suggest he does 
not belong on the bus. Gary, explains that his mother is white and his father was 
black, but that he identifies himself as black. The dialog continues: 
Gary: I already told you. I consider myself black. 
--Just like Bob Marley was black, ok? He was Mulatto. 
Flip: I'm not talking about him 
Gary: --I consider myself black. 
 
Flip: No disrespect partner. But I could consider myself six 
foot four and ugly. 
--The fact remains that I am six foot and too cute for the English 
vocabulary. 
 
Jeremiah: Mr. Hollywood? 
Flip: What? 
Jeremiah: The man is black. Why don't you just let him be? 
Flip: He is also white! 
 	  
 
Jeremiah:  Ifthis was slavery you think ole massa would care that 
he was half white? 
--He'd be a slave just like the rest of us. 
 
Flip: Yeah, but he'd be a house slave in the big house. 
While the rest of us would be talking about grits, he'd 
eat potatoes. 
--He'd have the breast of chicken; we'd have the neck 
bones .  
--Our women would be blistered and stinking from 
picking cotton; his would be bathed and smelling 
good. 
--And nine times out of ten, the honey he'd be hitting 
skins with, she'd be a white girl. 
 
Jeremiah: Hold it just a minute. 
--About the grits: grits was for the white folks up in the 
big house. Slaves would be lucky to get com mush. 
--And as for hitting skins with a white girl-a black 
man could get lynched for just thinking that thought. 
 
 
I have another example that I would like to compare with the scene above. A 
couple years ago at the APA central meeting in Chicago, I was sitting in on a 
session focused on Tommy Lott's recent book. The topic of discussion was racial 
identity and an audience member was describing a white friend that had adopted 
African-American children. She said that her friend sees herself as black because 
she has the same concerns that a black mother would have. Her feelings for her 
children were inconsistent with seeing them as racial others. Professor Lott replied 
that even though the woman identified with black mothers, she could not identify 
herself as black. What I find interesting about these examples (APA and Get on 
the Bus), is the evidence people put forth to justify racial self-identification. 
 	  
 
In the APA example, the woman has legitimate reason for aligning herself with a 
black mother's interests. However, in spite of her attachment to her children, she 
has not had the range of experience and social feedback that comes with being 
black. It is possible that her naivete, though well intended, actually shows a sense 
of entitlement or perhaps just unwarranted presumptiveness. Similarly, in Get on 
the Bus, Flip balks at Xavier's self-identification. It is as if he hasn't earned the 
identity because his light skin comes with privilege. Craig reminds them, however, 
that society dictates their identity with little regard for the difference in question. 
Demanding authentic racial self-identification does not suggest essentialism about 
race, it just acknowledges that race is socially constructed. However unfortunate, 
self-identification based in imagination lacks the structure that grounds race in 
reality. A chosen racial identity is essentially different from the sense in which 
imagination contributes to the subjective experience of race.  Aesthetic 
identification however is not bound by social construct, as is self-identification. 
Thus, a white mother who imagines herself in the role of black mothers identifies 
with them without assuming that racial identity for herself. On my view, the extent 
to which she feels the feelings of black mother will determine the possibility of 
empathy. Empathy with racial others, does not ignore important differences in 
identity. After one is aligned with the interests of another, one may take the next 
step and feel as they do. Imaginative self-identification takes socially imposed 
racial identity and re-creates it. Creative self-identification might invoke fictional 
 	  
 
characters or role models. Through aesthetic free-play, one loosens the hold of 
race as it is given. 
I think Noel Carroll's exclusion of identification is a flaw in his theory of 
aesthetic emotion. Imaginative identification captures an aspect of aesthetic 
experience that Carroll neglects and it would improve his theory. Furthermore, 
identification could be employed without the problems Carroll wants to avoid. 
Carroll's critique of identification does not consider self-identification beyond the 
arts. However, given the nature of Carroll's argument for dropping the term 
"identification," discussion on the topic with respect to race is particularly 
relevant. Carroll wants to replace 'identification' and 'empathy' with terms 
burdened by less philosophical baggage. His primary reason is that 'identification' 
and 'empathy' are not doing any special work for us when it comes to 
understanding the way we experience art. These concepts, however, do have an 
aesthetic function. Imaginative identification is indispensable to a constructionist 
account of race. 
Furthermore, imaginative identification and empathy are of particular importance 
in our experience with art. I cannot help but think of Tony Morrison's Beloved 
when I want to describe a personal experience of aesthetic empathy across racial 
difference. Sethe murders her children for fear that they will become slaves. 
Taking imaginative steps needed to accept this action teaches takes on her 
interests. Morrison guides the reader through Sethe's emotions and allows access 
 	  
 
to the emotional consequences of racism. One does not reasonably conclude a full 
grasp of these emotions, of course. I think the stages of imaginative identification 
are analogous to those taken by the white mother after adopting black children. 
She stepped into the shoes of a black mother by taking on certain concerns-she 
identified with black mothers. This was imaginative to some extent though not 
fictional. Her emotional connection was such that she had a strong sense of 
empathy for black mothers and this is probably what leads her to a mistaken self- 
identification. Just as this mother cannot claim to be a black woman, I cannot  
claim to know what is like to be Sethe. However, imaginative identification with 
her character sets up the conditions needed for empathy, just as the white mother's 
adoption of black children established conditions that lead to the emotional 
experience of a black mother. 
 
Conclusion: 
 
To recapitulate: I introduced this chapter by stating one of its functions: to 
defend my use of the race-concept in my view of racist jokes. Section I (early race 
theory) demonstrates the complicated relationship between 'race' and racism. It 
shows that it is especially important to see how race theory can be used in negative 
and positive ways despite the intentions of its original formulation. I think this is 
important because I am arguing that race has special characteristics that bear 
individual attention within other theories. An adequate theory of empathy, for 
example, must consider race. In light of this point, I directed my focus on those 
 	  
 
who claim that that talking about race legitimizes it and perpetuates racism. By 
appealing to constructivist definitions, I believe I have provided the needed 
justification  for paying attention to 'race.' 
I also I indicated that my investigation would reveal a weak point in race 
theory that could be strengthened by my view of empathy. Toward that end, 
Section II surveys current theory. I sketch out arguments for the position that 
 
'race' is a meaningful concept. These arguments all emphasize the social reality of 
race. Linda Martin Alcoff identifies two levels in contextual theories. I describe 
both of these levels (objective and subjective) and explain how they are both 
needed to establish the reality of race. In addition to showing that race is real on 
the objective level, contextual theory recognizes the need to understand race on 
the subjective level. My work adds to the contextual theory, since aesthetic 
empathy and identification cultivate respect for the subjective experience of race. 
Section III shows how the work done by race theorists affects debates in 
aesthetics and ethics. I argue that aesthetic self-identification contributes to self- 
realization and this is morally valuable. I believe that the importance of self- 
identification with respect to race creates a moral imperative-we must 
incorporate a discussion of race into the discussion of aesthetic identification 
Narrative artistry encourages imaginative self-identification whereas narrative 
failure interferes. Ifwe throw out the concept of aesthetic identification, we lose 
access to an important source of aesthetic value. Our understanding of narrative art 
 	  
 
forms is limited when we disregard the way we engage with them. An adequate 
theory of aesthetic affect must include self-identification. Likewise, a robust 
theory of empathy must also take race into consideration for its own sake. Because 
race can be an obstacle to empathy, it sheds light on the nature of empathy and 
difference. Focusing on race in, I have argued that "empathy" describes an 
experience that philosophers cannot capture with other terminology.  Furthermore, 
my discussion of imaginative self-identification has implications for the way we 
understand aesthetic affect, specifically identification, sympathy and empathy. In 
the next chapter, I tum to an analysis of these often-conflated term. 























































































































